Abstract: With tensions rising in the South China Sea, China's use of its economic leverage over Southeast Asian countries has recently come into focus. With increasing economic and trade ties between China and Southeast Asia, the question being asked is whether China can successfully impose economic sanctions to gain policy concessions in the South China Sea disputes. This paper examines China's relations with the Philippines and Vietnam and analyses the possibility of a successful economic sanction by China against these two countries in future disputes. The article concludes that Vietnam may be more vulnerable economically to Chinese sanctions than the Philippines. However, political factors would offset that vulnerability in the case of Vietnam and amplify it in the case of the Philippines, making the Philippines more likely to concede to modest political demands.
Introduction
The South China Sea has become an area of focus lately. Economic ties between China and Southeast Asia have reached an unprecedented level. At the same time, maritime disputes in the South China Sea have strained relations between China and other Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. This raises the following question: To what extent would China's economic leverage over these countries help it gain political concessions? The standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 has prompted some to comment that economic coercion is becoming a norm for China (Glaser 2012) . But does China's economic leverage translate into political gain? This paper seeks to examine the question of whether China can effectively apply economic sanctions to obtain policy concessions from the Philippines and Vietnam over future disputes in the South China Sea.
This paper 1 uses the definition by Hufbauer et al. (2009) for the term "economic sanction" -or "economic coercion": 2 "the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations" (Hufbauer et al. 2009: 3) . While opinions are mixed regarding the effectiveness of sanctions, it cannot be denied that the popularity of economic sanctions as a political instrument has grown in recent times (Drezner 2003) . The increase in interdependence due to economic globalization has itself widened the scope for sanctions, as pointed out by various studies detailing the relationship between trade linkages and economic sanctions (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2012; Hirshman 1980) . While analysing economic sanctions, there are three questions to consider: Why and when do countries impose sanctions, and under what conditions do they succeed? Theories on why states impose sanctions range from response to domestic pressure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983) to conflict expectations, to a gap in opportunity costs (Drezner 1999) . However, there is a general consensus that the primary factor determining the efficacy of economic sanctions is political (Drezner 1999; Blanchard and Ripsman 1999) . In general, the objectives of a country implementing economic sanctions are to elicit compliance from a target; to subvert a target regime; and to deter a target from pursuing an unfavourable policy, thereby sending a powerful signal to the world and its own population (Lindsay 1986: 153-154) . It is important to note that all views expressed here are the author's own and do not, in any way, reflect the views of the organization he belongs to or the government he represents. 2 Sanctions literature does differentiate between "sanction" and "coercion". However, for the sake of simplicity, I will use the two terms interchangeably here.
ever, there is no consensus on when sanctions succeed. Extensive case studies by Hufbauer et al. (2009) found very marginal rates of success. In order to succeed, either the economic sanctions must magnify the political costs of non-compliance, or the political costs of compliance must be less than the economic costs of non-compliance for the target's political class (Blanchard and Ripman 1999) . Literature on the effectiveness of economic sanctions generally takes into account two variables: the economic and the political. Hufbauer et al. (2009) mention the following economic variables: cost imposed on the target, trade linkages between the target and the sender, relative economic size, economic health and political stability of the target, the type of sanctions used, and cost to sender. Some political variables to be considered are the type of concessions demanded, the history of relations between the sender and the target, political conditions within the target, "companion policies" employed by the sender, international cooperation with the sender, and international assistance to the target (Hufbauer et al. 2009 ). In general, successful economic sanctions tend to have the following characteristics (Hufbauer et al. 2009; Drezner 1999 ):
1. Sanctions targeting modest political goals are more effective than those targeting major concessions. 2. Prior relations between the sender and the target country are cordial. 3. The period of time sanctions are in place is short and the impact is maximal; the difference in opportunity cost between the target and the sender is large. 4. There is little or no third-party assistance to the target (Bonetti 1998) .
There are also a number of studies that analyse the nature of target regimes that are most vulnerable to sanctions. Studies have shown that, generally, a democratic polity is more vulnerable to economic sanctions and more likely to give in to modest demands when the sanctions are directed at the general economy of the target or against particular interest groups (Allen 2005; Brooks 2002) . A non-democracy may be more vulnerable if the sanctions target elite members of the regime (Kirshner 1997; Brooks 2002) or are implemented or ongoing during conditions of economic downturn, when the stability of the regime depends on a stable economy (Major 2012) .
A study of when economic sanctions work is especially significant now because there have been a number of commentaries on China's increasing willingness to use economic sanctions to obtain policy concessions, especially in cases involving territorial disputes (Tong 2010; Glaser 2012; Ge 2012; Zhong and Wu 2012) . However, while most of the sanctions described by Hufbauer et al. are explicit -meaning, the sender has made clear its inten-tion to impose sanctions -in regard to China, the cases described by Glaser (2012) are implicit: The intention to impose sanctions was never officially acknowledged, and sometimes even explicitly denied. Therefore, the targets have been forced to function in an unclear atmosphere where the imposition of economic sanctions has been identified only through sudden trade policy changes after a dispute surfaces. However, while there may be "deniability" and "ambiguity" when seen from the Chinese side, what is more important is how the target perceives the policy changes -that is, whether the target considers the economic policy changes to be "sanctions". Taking that into consideration, the targets in Glaser (2012) -meaning, either the governments of the target country or certain important sections affected by trade policy changes -have generally considered these changes to be "economic sanctions" in response to particular disputes.
Here, while analysing the effectiveness of economic sanctions by China against the Philippines and Vietnam, I will also examine the general political and economic relations between China and those two countries and speculate on the effectiveness of future sanctions in economic and political terms. The choice of these two countries is relevant because there are a number of similarities and differences between the two. Both have disputes with China in the South China Sea and have clashed with China in the region. However, with regards to the Philippines -a democracy with a free media -prior relations with China have been cordial. On the other side, Vietnam, a oneparty state, with a less-free media than the Philippines, has a history of conflict with China and a nationalistic narrative antagonistic toward China. Therefore, it is interesting to compare the effect of Chinese economic sanctions on these two countries. Hufbauer et al. (2009) also include "companion policies" -such as threat of military action -in their analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions. Economic sanctions are seldom imposed in isolation and are often accompanied by other policies, including the threat of military action. However, the opinions in the sanctions literature about the impact that a military threat has on economic sanctions are mixed. Some scholars argue that economic sanctions, per se, cannot achieve any major foreign policy goal, such as resolving a territorial dispute, and have to be accompanied by military threat (Pape 1997) . However, others argue that threatening military action may not be a significant factor in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and that economic sanctions themselves function as a substitute for other measures (see Drezner 1999 Drezner , 2003 . 3 In the present study, since we are looking into territorial disputes, we may assume that there will also be certain "companion policies", the inclusion of which does not significantly alter the analysis of economic coercion, per se. This paper proceeds in the following manner: In the second section, I will discuss the South China Sea disputes in brief and China's relations with the two target countries. The third section will cover the economic effect of future sanctions, while in the fourth I will analyse the political impact of these sanctions with regard to their ability to elicit political concessions. The final section comprises concluding observations.
The South China Sea Disputes and China's Relations with the Philippines and Vietnam
The disputes over the South China Sea are unique for three reasons: one, the sheer number of parties involved; two, the importance of the sea lanes there; and three, to a certain extent, the dispute has turned into a power struggle between China and the US with Southeast Asia caught in the middle (Kaplan 2011 2012b) . In this regard, the standoff that occurred between China and the Philippines in the waters surrounding the Scarborough Shoal assumes significance for the subject we are discussing here because this incident was seen as a successful application of economic coercion by China (Glaser 2012) . 4 Hence, it merits further elaboration. In April 2012, in response to Chinese fishing vessels operating in the waters surrounding the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines dispatched a naval vessel to the region. China responded by sending in its Marine Surveillance vessels, resulting in a standoff. The Philippines withdrew its warship, and replaced it with a coast guard vessel, while China dispatched its Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels. Barely one month later, it was reported that China had imposed strict phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas. 4 As mentioned earlier, the government of China did not overtly connect the trade restrictions to the standoff. The Philippine embassy in China also denied that there was a connection. However, it cannot be disputed that the existence of certain economic measures, including phytosanitary restrictions on banana imports and the cancellation of tourist visits, were reported at about the same time as the altercation surfaced. Further, the banana industry in the Philippines considered these measures a direct response to the dispute (Avendano and Lacorte 2012) . This ambiguity in economic sanctions has been characteristic of China in the past few instances.
Further, Chinese travel agencies also suspended travel to the Philippines (BBC News 2012). The Philippines later came to an agreement with China that entailed a simultaneous withdrawal of both countries' vessels from the area. Though the arrival of a typhoon in the region and the imminent Chinese fishing ban gave good reason for the Philippines to arrive at this facesaving agreement, the impact of domestic pressure, especially from the banana traders, cannot be discounted (Avendano and Lacorte 2012; MindaNews 2012) . This has prompted analysts to question whether this behaviour is going to be the norm in future disputes involving China (Glaser 2012) . In order to answer this question with specific reference to the Philippines and Vietnam, the following section goes into the relations that these two countries have with China. (Lim 1999) . However, China was also more flexible in the South China Sea issue after 1995, as shown by the bilateral agreement signed with the Philippines in which both countries agreed to settle the dispute in accordance with international law. Relations between the two countries peaked under the government of President Gloria Arroyo, when they decided to establish a "strategic and cooperative relationship for peace and development" and referred to a "golden age of partnership" ( Table 1 gives an account of the extent of the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries. The importance to the Philippines of an economic relationship with China, especially in the case of FDI from China, at a time of slow GDP growth cannot be overstated. The first six months of 2011 saw investments worth 33 million USD coming from China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC 2011a). During Philippine President Aquino's visit to China in 2011, four mining agreements were signed with Chinese companies that are estimated to bring in 14 billion USD in investments by 2016 (Andrade 2011) . At the same time, however, Chinese investments have also become controversial from time to time. In fact, one of the accusations levelled against former 5 All economic data quoted in this paper, including figures for trade, GDP, FDI flows, etc., have been sourced from, or are calculations based on, statistics from UNCTAD, unless otherwise specifically noted.
China-Philippines Relations
President Arroyo is that she ignored the South China Sea dispute in return for Chinese investments (International Crisis Group 2012b: 6). In China's eyes, the government of President Arroyo was seen as more accommodating of China's concerns, especially those over the South China Sea (International Crisis Group 2012b). However, relations between China and the Philippines turned sour after President Benigno Aquino III came into office in 2010 (Cruz de Castro 2012). The South China Sea dispute soon took centre stage. In March 2011, one of the first incidents involving the Philippines and China occurred in the Reed Bank, when Chinese Marine Surveillance ships forced a Philippine seismic survey vessel to leave the area (Storey 2011) . It was also in 2011 that the Philippines started referring to the South China Sea as the "West Philippine Sea". The Scarborough Shoal incident is the latest in a series of events that has involved the Philippines and China since then.
China-Vietnam Relations
China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict and cooperation. To focus just on the recent history, the two sides fought a war in 1979 and had two skirmishes over disputes in the South China Sea, one in 1974 and the other in 1988, the former resulting in China taking possession of the part of the Paracels, which were under the control of the erstwhile Republic of Vietnam. Such a history, it is argued, has resulted in a situation where Vietnam would not hesitate to go to war with China over disputes in the South China Sea in spite of the overwhelming superiority of the Chinese military (International Crisis Group 2012b: 3).
On the political level, relations between the two countries have been good since bilateral relations were normalized in 1991. The situation benefitted, to a certain extent, from the fact that China and Vietnam share a communist ideology (Tønnesson 2003: 58) . The two countries agreed on a landboundary settlement in 1999 and a maritime settlement in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000. On the other hand, given the history of their relations, there is widespread distrust of China among the Vietnamese to the extent that even these settlements were criticized (Tønnesson 2003: 62-63 Chinese aid to Vietnam is also estimated to be substantial (Lum et al. 2009 ) and involves financing hydro-and thermal power projects, ship-building projects, fertilizer plants, etc. The number of projects undertaken in Vietnam by Chinese agencies is growing. According to one estimate, more than 90 per cent of EPC (engineering, procurement and construction) contracts awarded in recent years to Vietnam's industrial projects have gone to Chinese contractors (Le Hong Hiep 2011) . With regards to the South China Sea, as noted earlier, the two countries had engaged in military confrontation twice in this area. Tension between the two countries soared from 2009 onwards. The visit of the general secretary of the CPV, Nguyen Phu Trong, to China in October 2011 improved relations, as the two countries signed a six-point agreement to resolve maritime disputes. But, in June 2012, Vietnam passed a law asserting its jurisdiction over the disputed islands in the South China Sea (Reuters 2012) , and China announced the establishment of Sansha City on Woody Island (known as Yongxing Island in Chinese) in the Paracels and asserted its own jurisdiction over the disputed islands (Xinhua 2012) . Thus, tensions between the two countries have far from dissipated.
Concessions That May Be Demanded
There are two explanations for why the South China Sea disputes are important to the countries involved -the perceived abundance of energy and marine resources, and issues of sovereignty (Thayer 2011b) . 6 With this in mind, we may classify some of the concessions that China might demand from the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea into two categories: "modest" and "major", according to the sanctions literature. One modest concession that may be demanded is that Philippine and Vietnamese officials refrain from arresting or harassing Chinese fishermen in the disputed waters. Demand for the target countries to comply with the Chinese fishing ban may be regarded as modest or major, depending on the situation at hand. Similarly, demands that the target countries refrain from unilateral exploration of resources, or that the exploration for resources be a joint effort by the target countries and China, may be classified as modest or major depending on the situation. For instance, the strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam would regard such demands as major concessions, whereas the Philippines may or may not regard a joint exploration in the disputed waters as a major concession. While such a demand may have been regarded as "modest" in the Philippines before the Scarborough Shoal incident, it may not be now. China may also demand that the targets refrain from involving third countries or internationalizing the dispute. We may classify this as a modest concession depending on the situation. However, considering the fact that non-involvement of third countries would definitely reduce the leverage of the two target countries vis-à-vis China, it is equally possible that such demands be regarded as major. Demands from China that Vietnam or the Philippines abandon claims to territory or recognize Chinese claims on the South China Sea either fully or partially would definitely be considered major. It should be clear that the target country's perception would also depend on prior relations. Thus, the same kind of demands may be modest to the Philippines but major to Vietnam. Finally, it is important to note that whether a demand is modest or major depends entirely on the given situation at that time. Therefore, I will not go into detail on the exact concessions that may be demanded, but would rather restrict myself to the two general descriptions -namely, "modest" and "major" demands. 6 There is no agreement on the exact amount of resources in the region. While some estimates, including Chinese estimates, tend to be high, there are also many others that downplay the presence of resources in the region.
Potential for Economic Coercion
Economic sanctions may be imposed through three means: export restrictions, import restrictions, and financial sanctions that include the cutting off of aid (Hufbauer et al. 2009 ). According to the Hufbauer case studies, the method employed depends on the nature of economic relations between the sender and the target. In the case of trade restrictions, the effectiveness of sanctions depends also on the products traded between the two countries (Dorussen 2006) . Table 3 shows the economic linkages between China and the Philippines and Vietnam. Undoubtedly, China's economy is much bigger than the other two. However, the size of the economy alone is not the determining criterion for the effectiveness of economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2009 ). Therefore, it is essential to analyse other aspects of the relationship.
China is a major trading partner to both the Philippines and Vietnam. However, while China is only the third-largest trading partner of the Philippines, it is the largest of Vietnam. In addition, the level of dependence on total trade and on trade with China is different for each country. In this regard, Vietnam's economy is much more dependent on external trade than is that of the Philippines. As shown in Table 1 , trade with China amounted to 36.3 per cent of Vietnam's GDP in 2011. In comparison, trade with China amounted to only approximately 5.6 per cent of the Philippine GDP. Thus, as far as trade linkages are concerned, Vietnam is much more dependent on China for its economic growth than is the Philippines.
China is a very important market for the Philippines. Electronic products are the major exports of the Philippines to China. More specifically, they are automatic data-processing machines (Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) product no. 752), cathode valves and tubes (SITC 776), and accessories for office machines and data-processing machines (SITC 759). These products are also among the major exports of the Philippines to the world. The Philippines' reliance on the Chinese market can be gleaned from the fact that among the product groups SITC 752 and 759, the Chinese market accounts for 50 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively, of those Philippine exports. However, this reliance does not translate into dependence on China. This is mainly because a majority of Philippine exports to China are "manufactured goods with high skill and technology intensity" and hence not easily substitutable.
The semiconductor industry is a case in point. China views integrated circuits as a strategic sector that needs to be promoted (Xinhua 2011) . The electronics industry in China grew by 11.3 per cent in the first ten months of 2012, higher than the average GDP growth rate for the same period, and the production of integrated circuits grew by 10.2 per cent (National Bureau of Statistics 2012). It is also a major employment generator in China, especially in the southern region. Therefore, the cost of implementing import sanctions on this product would be high for China. Any disruption of these imports would raise the costs for the Chinese economy.
Other big exports from the Philippines to China are nickel ores and concentrates (SITC 284) and copper (SITC 682). Almost all nickel exports from the Philippines go to China. Looking at it from the other side, 21 per cent of China's nickel imports come from the Philippines. While there are indeed alternative sources of nickel ores such as Indonesia and Australia, the sheer quantity of imports raises the cost of sanctions for China, as substitution cannot be effected in the short term. With regard to copper, the Philippines is one of the major copper-producing countries in the world, and nearly 25 per cent of its copper exports go to China. But, only 2 per cent of China's imports come from the Philippines, and the Philippines does not figure in the list of the top-ten source countries of copper for China. Therefore, if only the trade linkages are considered, then the Philippines is more dependent on China as a destination for its copper exports. However, given that copper is an important industrial raw material, and considering the fact that China is also one of the major investors in Philippine copper, it is highly improbable that there will be any sort of restriction on this product.
Another major category of Philippine export to China is fruits and nuts (SITC 057). More specifically, 16 per cent of Philippine banana exports in 2011 went to China. The Scarborough Shoal incident showed how vulnerable the Philippines was to Chinese restrictions on banana imports. Banana is the most important fruit crop in the Philippines, with production in 2011 amounting to nine million metric tons (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2012). It is also a major exporter earner. China's quarantine restrictions are said to have caused losses of up to one billion PHP (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2012). On the Chinese side, the import of Philippine bananas constituted merely 0.02 per cent of its total imports overall and just 12 per cent of its total imports of fruits. Thus, in the short term, the cost of implementing import sanctions on fruits from the Philippines is negligible for China.
Manufactured goods constitute 77 per cent of total Philippine imports from China. Major imports include telecommunications equipment and parts (SITC 764), along with parts and accessories for office machines and automatic data-processing machines (SITC 759). More than 29 per cent of its imports of telecommunications parts come from China. This is important given the fact that telecommunications is a fast-growing sector in the Philippines that is expected to grow even further (Export.gov 2011) . Electrical apparatuses (SITC 772), electrical machinery and apparatuses (SITC 778) and electrical power machinery (SITC 771) constitute other major imports, with a large percentage sourced from China. Most of the imports mentioned above are intermediate goods to be used in Philippine industries, especially in the fast-growing electrical machinery and electronics sector. Therefore, any disruption of supply of these products would be detrimental to the Phil-ippines in the short run. However, there is also a high opportunity cost for China in implementing such export restrictions as it may harm its own export-oriented industry.
The Philippines may be more vulnerable in the services sector. The tourism industry, for instance, is an important part of the Philippine economy. Travel services earned 3.1 billion USD in 2011. By one estimate, the tourism industry directly contributed to 2 per cent of the GDP of the Philippines, besides providing for 778,000 jobs in 2011 (World Travel and Tourism Council 2012) . China was the fourth-largest source of tourists to the Philippines in 2011 (Tourism Research and Statistics Division 2012) . Cancellations of tourist visits by Chinese tourists are estimated to have resulted in losses of up to one million USD for the tourist industry . The vulnerability of the Philippines in this sector becomes evident when we consider the fact that the opportunity cost for China in issuing a negative travel advisory for its citizens vis-à-vis the Philippines is minimal.
China is also an important source of ODA, as noted above. China's financing in the Philippines primarily covers agriculture, infrastructure and mining (Lum et al. 2009: 16) . A credit squeeze by China may inflict more harm to the Philippines than trade restrictions would. In fact, voices have already been raised in China suggesting aid cuts (Global Times 2012). But while imposing such restrictions, China should also consider the impact of doing so on Chinese investments.
In sum, China possesses adequate economic leverage over the Philippines only in terms of import restrictions on primary products such as fruits, and on restriction on travel. The opportunity cost for China of implementing certain kinds of sanctions, including export restrictions on manufactured products, would be very high. Even in terms of import restrictions, we are looking at short-term effects here since the longer a country can resist sanctions, the costlier it becomes for the sender and the less effective the sanctions become.
The case of Vietnam is quite different from that of the Philippines. As previously noted, trade with China amounted to 36.3 per cent of Vietnam's GDP in 2011. China is the largest export destination for Vietnam's primary commodities. Primary commodities accounted for 71.78 per cent of Vietnam's total exports to China. Primary commodities other than fuels constituted 43 per cent of its total exports. Major exports of Vietnam to China include natural rubber (SITC 231), coal (SITC 321) and petroleum oils (SITC 333). Labour-intensive and resource-based manufactures that are highly substitutable constitute 39 per cent of its total exports of manufactured products to China, chief among these being textile yarn (SITC 651).
Easy substitutability of these products makes sanctions less costly for China while, at the same time, making Vietnam more vulnerable.
For instance, more than 62 per cent of Vietnam's rubber exports go to China. The rubber industry is very important in Vietnam and the government of Vietnam has developed a master plan to develop the industry by 2015. Over-dependence on the Chinese market for rubber has been acknowledged, but attempts at diversification have not met with any considerable success so far (Vietnam news 2012a, 2012b) . This is just one illustration of Vietnam's vulnerability with regards to import restrictions from China.
Vietnam's vulnerability becomes magnified when its imports are considered. In contrast to the Philippines, China is more important as a supplier than as a market for Vietnam. More than one-fourth of Vietnam's imports in 2011 came from China. Manufactured goods constitute 84 per cent of these imports. More than half of the manufactured goods imported by Vietnam are those with "medium and high skill and technology intensity". Moreover, Vietnam's major imports from China are also the products that constitute its major imports overall. For example, among the major imports of Vietnam, 61.6 per cent of telecommunications equipment and parts (SITC 764), which are also one of its major imports overall, came from China in 2011. Nearly half of Vietnam's fertilizer imports come from China. Vietnam's import dependence on China has been acknowledged as worrisome, though there has not been any considerable shift so far (see Economist 2012a).
From an energy perspective, over 60 per cent of Vietnam's imports of rotating electric plants and parts (SITC716), including motors and generators, are sourced from China. Approximately 4.65 billion kWh of power was estimated to be imported from China in 2012 (VGP News 2011). Any disruption in this supply could cause serious harm to the Vietnamese economy (see Vietnam Net 2011) . The National Energy Development Strategy of Vietnam hopes to cut down on the import of energy. However, as of now, this dependence represents a serious vulnerability for the Vietnamese economy.
There is also widespread illegal trade and smuggling across the borders (Ha Thi Hong Van and Do Tien Sam 2009 ). In the event of trade sanctions, this illegal activity would reduce the effects of such sanctions a little. The existence of a porous border would make it very difficult for China to strictly enforce sanctions on trade. Nevertheless, that does not neutralize the hold that China has on Vietnam's trade and its capacity to inflict considerable economic harm upon Vietnam.
Financial sanctions by China could take the form of an aid or investment cut. In fact, it was reported that China had cut aid to Vietnam in re-sponse to Vietnam inviting Taiwan to attend the APEC forum's informal leaders summit in Hanoi in 2006 (Mitton 2006) .
On the flip side, the existence of Chinese investments in Vietnam may be a disadvantage for China when it considers sanctions. One study, for example, theorizes that the higher the percentage of wholly owned investments in a target country, the less the likelihood is of sanctions being imposed (Kim 2011) . According to Chen (2011) , over 67 per cent of Chinese investments in Vietnam are wholly owned, while joint ventures constitute only around 25 per cent of total. Thus, according to Kim (2011) , though sanctions curtailing aid or investment may be detrimental to Vietnam in terms of job losses, they would also come at a very high cost to China.
In sum, China's economic hold over Vietnam is so strong that it can inflict heavy damage to Vietnam's economy through trade sanctions. Though China has to consider how sanctions would affect its investments in Vietnam, this does not remove the high degree of vulnerability that Vietnam is exposed to. In that sense, Vietnam is more vulnerable than the Philippines in terms of economic costs to be borne. However, the effectiveness of sanctions does not depend on economic damage alone, though that is an important aspect. As was explained earlier, the effectiveness of sanctions has to be measured in terms of China's capacity to transmit economic damage to the political realm.
Political Impact of Economic Sanctions
Some of the ways in which a political goal can be achieved using economic sanctions include using pressure groups and business interests within the target country to exert pressure on the government, and formulating public opinion against a government policy through the use of general macroeconomic sanctions.
Sanctions Aimed at Particular Groups
As stated earlier, various studies have surmised that sanctions would be more effective on a democracy, provided the demands are modest (Brooks 2002) . The nature of the relationship between politics and business in the Philippines may make the country more vulnerable to coercion. One of the characteristics of the Philippine political economy is the presence of a powerful oligarchic class (Palanca 2006) . This class dominates both the politics and the economy of the country and is very influential. The existence of a powerful class may lessen the economic cost for China of imposing sanctions. Targeted sanctions, directed at particular groups in the Philippines, would make political compliance easier to obtain. For instance, it was reported that China had pressured Philippine legislators in 2009 to change the country's baseline law in favour of China (Dutton 2012) .
As an example, let us consider China's imposition of sanctions on banana imports from the Philippines. Banana plantations are concentrated in the Mindanao region of the Philippines and are an important export generator and employment generator in the region, as noted in Section 3 above. The fact that this large industry is concentrated in a particular region makes it a powerful lobby in a democracy. From the sender's side, the objective was modest: the withdrawal of Philippine vessels from the area (also entailing that Philippine officials refrain from harassing Chinese fishermen, as noted in Section 2). Moreover, China was also ready for a "compromise" by virtue of the fact that the annual fishing ban came into effect at the same time as a storm in the region blew in. Therefore, the sanctions were effective enough in eliciting the Philippines' compliance. 7 On the other hand, if China had implemented the same kind of sanctions but demanded a major policy concession, then, as pointed out by Hufbauer et al. (2009) , powerful groups may have come together to back the ruling class. If that were to happen, economic sanctions may fail for two reasons: one, they are too inadequate; and two, they may be counterproductive to China's objectives of gaining political concessions by exploiting the regional differences within the Philippines.
Vietnam, on the other hand, does not have such a large and powerful business class that can be exploited by China. However, the CPV itself functions as the oligarchic class. In the case of Vietnam, which is not a democracy, sanctions tend to be more effective when focused against the party elite or state-run organizations (Kirshner 1997; Brooks 2002) . The close linkages between the CPV and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would tend to make coercion easier for China. But, the history of conflict between Vietnam and China would mean that China can reasonably expect only modest concessions by using such methods (Drezner 1999) . However, even in this case, there are strong incentives for the political class of Vietnam not to comply with China's economic coercion, primarily because of the antiChinese nationalistic sentiment in Vietnam (International Crisis Group 2012b). Any concession toward China by the CPV is regarded as a "sell-out" in Vietnam (Economist 2012a). Thus, the ruling elite in Vietnam would have to consider the domestic cost of compliance with sanctions initiated by China. In other words, the incentive for the political class to comply with targeted sanctions against them would most likely be offset by nationalistic sentiments in Vietnam. Therefore, in order to elicit a modest policy concession, sanctions have to be sufficiently large, thus increasing the cost to China. We can almost rule out major policy concessions using the same rationale.
General Sanctions Aimed at Causing Macroeconomic Instability
Sanctions may also be directed at the general economy of the target in order to elicit compliance. However, before dealing with that issue, let us first return to my description of the uniqueness of recent Chinese sanctions with regard to their "ambiguity" and "deniability". When the sanctions are aimed at the economy of the target in general, such "deniability" may be difficult.
With this important distinction in mind, I will proceed to analyse the effect of such sanctions on the Philippines and Vietnam. The year 2011 was politically difficult for the Philippines (Holmes 2012) . However, 2012 does appear to be stabilizing. For example, the Philippine government is moving fast toward bringing the Islamic insurgency in Mindanao to an end. On the economic front, GDP growth slowed to 3.8 per cent in 2011. Though prospects for economic recovery do appear bright, with growth surging to 6.1 per cent in the first half of 2012 (National Statistics Coordination Board 2012a), the projected growth for 2012 is still low, at 5 per cent (World Bank 2012) . The unemployment rate is still high, at 7 per cent as of July 2012 (National Statistics Coordination Board 2012b). Therefore, on the whole, the Philippines appears to be a country with a number of economic and political problems, though it is recovering rapidly. According to Brooks (2002) , therefore, the Philippines has to be vulnerable to economic coercion aimed at creating general economic instability. Thus, modest policy demands by China are likely to elicit compliance. However, the same democratic nature of Philippine politics that makes it more likely to concede to modest policy demands may backfire in cases where major concessions are demanded. In such cases, economic sanctions may, in fact, create conditions for unity within the Philippine polity. Further, even when modest policy concessions are demanded, the cost of imposing such general sanctions would be too high for China because some of China's own industries are linked to trade with the Philippines. In other words, to paraphrase Drezner (1999) , the difference in opportunity cost may not be high enough for China to implement such sanctions.
Vietnam was also beset by domestic problems, politically as well as economically, as the Vietnamese populace directly criticized the CPV (Fforde 2012) . Growth rate also slowed to an estimated 5.2 per cent in 2012 (World Bank 2012) . Inflation levels soared to 18.7 per cent in 2011 and comprise one of the main destabilizing factors in the Vietnamese polity (Economic Intelligence Unit 2012). Though inflation slowed to 5 per cent by August 2012, it has started rising again, and as of October it stood at 7 per cent. In that context, as Major (2012) surmised for non-democratic regimes, Vietnam would be very vulnerable in the present situation to economic sanctions by China aimed at creating general macro-economic instability. However, this vulnerability also depends on the nature of political concessions that may be demanded by China. Modest concessions such as refraining from arresting or harassing Chinese fishermen in the disputed waters would be more likely to elicit compliance. Of course, the cost of obtaining such compliance would also be high for China since it has to implement a general sanction aimed at all sectors of the economy. Moreover, the Vietnamese blame the political class in Vietnam for the increasing political and economic clout of China (Fforde 2012: 184) . Therefore, the political class may find compliance politically less costly if the economic cost of noncompliance is significantly higher. For the same reason, a major demand by China may make the political cost of compliance higher than the cost of non-compliance for Vietnam's leaders.
Effect of Prior Relations on Sanctions Compliance
Philippine-Chinese relations, as has been noted already, have been improving steadily. Nationalistic sentiments in the Philippines have more to do with concerns over the Muslim insurgency in the country than the South China Sea (International Crisis Group 2012b: 21) . However, the value that the Philippines ascribes to the dispute seems to be growing (Sun Star 2012; Szep and Pomfret 2012) . One reason for this is the assertive Chinese policy with respect to the South China Sea. Chinese assertiveness, including the recent economic coercion of the Philippines, would likely increase the political cost of compliance in future disputes, thus increasing the cost of economic sanctions for China even for modest policy demands.
China and Vietnam, in comparison, have conflicting interests not only in the South China Sea but also in other areas, such as China's dam-building in the Mekong River, the widening trade deficit, etc. Hence, considering the conflict-expectation model (Drezner 1999 ), Vietnam's expectations of a future conflict with China are high. We also have to consider the unfavourable nationalistic narrative: Even Chinese investments, such as those for bauxite mining in the Central Highlands, have run into opposition (Economist 2009). Nationalism can, however, be a double-edged sword for Vietnamese leaders (International Crisis Group 2012b: 20) . For one, Vietnamese leaders have to walk a tightrope in terms of balancing such sentiments against the need for economic growth. Moreover, in the past, nationalist protests against China have easily shifted to protests against the CPV itself (International Crisis Group 2012b: 21; Shultz II 2012: 11) . The dilemma is not restricted to Vietnamese leaders, though. It also means that, for a successful economic coercion, the Chinese sanctions must be large enough that the Vietnamese leadership feels it necessary to prioritize economic stability while, at the same time, the political demands must be modest enough that nationalistic sentiments are not fuelled. In other words, economic sanctions on Vietnam would be a high-cost, low-return venture for China.
Effect of Third Parties on Sanctions Compliance
The cost of non-compliance with economic sanctions would be reduced if third parties were to come to the assistance of the target state. Such assistance could consist of either economic support against sanctions, as was indicated in a number of case studies by Hufbauer et al. (2009) , or political support that would incentivize the target country to resist the sender's sanctions. The Philippines has, for example, consistently tried to internationalize the dispute with China (Lim 1999) . In the present instance, the US was perceived to have neglected its ally, the Philippines (Spitzer 2012) , which may have influenced the latter's decision to comply. If the US comes to the assistance of the Philippines, it would substantially alter the sanctions dynamic. Similarly, the improvement in the relationship between the US and Vietnam, including in the military arena (Wan 2012) , would impact the ability of China to engage in a successful economic coercion. Further research may be needed to specifically determine how third-party intervention would affect the sanctions imposed by China in the case of the South China Sea disputes.
Conclusion
This paper looked at the possibility of effective economic sanctions by China directed against the Philippines and Vietnam in future disputes in the South China Sea. We find that both countries have a high degree of trade linkages with China. However, the Philippines is economically less vulnerable to import and export restrictions from China. Vietnam, on the other hand, is highly vulnerable to any trade restrictions. Though I did not calculate the exact cost to the Vietnamese economy, the level of dependence on China would be enough to predict that the cost borne by Vietnam would be much higher than the opportunity cost that China would have to bear in imposing trade restrictions.
On the other hand, Vietnam's economic vulnerability would be neutralized by political factors that make Vietnam less likely than the Philippines to concede to China's demands, be they modest or major. This is mainly due to the unfavourable view of China among the Vietnamese public. However, it is possible that a large-scale economic disruption due to Chinese sanctions would make the cost of compliance less than the cost of non-compliance for Vietnam's political class in the case of modest demands. At the same time, the Philippines is more likely to concede to modest demands from China. The political cost of compliance for major demands, on the other hand, would be very high. However, this equation may change in future. This is primarily because China's handling of the Scarborough Shoal standoff has resulted in the development of negative opinions of China. This increases the political cost of Philippine compliance with China's demands. Or, it may lead to a change in perception, whereby demands that would have been seen as modest in the past would now be seen as major.
Finally, there are a few more factors that help form the basis for future research on the effectiveness of Chinese sanctions. One is China's reputation with regard to economic sanctions. China's use of its economic leverage to obtain policy concessions has been increasing lately (Glaser 2012; Economist 2012b; The Diplomat 2012) . The recent impasse at the ASEAN summit, in particular, has been ascribed to China's economic leverage over Cambodia. There are two ways in which this can influence future actions by targets: The first possibility is that they may anticipate economic sanctions and refrain from pursuing actions that China may view as unfavourable. However, this is unlikely, given the inherent asymmetry of information regarding the extent of China's demands, compounded by the element of "ambiguity" in Chinese sanctions described earlier. The second possibility is that expectations of future coercion may make the targets more reluctant to concede to any Chinese demand, even if it is modest, and may actually result in a tilt toward a third power such as the US.
Another factor that can help form the basis for future research is the influence of third parties, including international organizations such as ASEAN and individual countries such as the US, a topic briefly touched upon in this paper. China, for instance, blames the involvement of the US for rising tensions in the South China Sea (Sun 2012) . Further research in this regard could focus on how the involvement of third parties might influence the behaviour of the targets and of China itself.
